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Justice Byron R. White: A Modern Federalist 
and a New Deal Liberal 
William E. Nelson* 
"Conventional wisdom," as chronicled by a sympathetic 
former law clerk, "suggests that Justice White has been a 
disappointment because he did not turn out to be the 'liberal' 
that many expected of President John F. Kennedy's first 
appointee."' Contrary to this perceived wisdom, I believe that 
Byron R. White was appointed to the Supreme Court because 
he was a Kennedy liberal and that, although the Justice's 
approach may have changed marginally during his three 
decades on the bench,2 on the whole he adhered faithfully to 
the political values that had led to his appointment. The 
considerable divergence that existed between Justice White's 
voting record and the voting patterns of other liberal Justices, 
such as his close personal friend, William J. Brennan, who sat 
on the Court with Justice White for all but Justice White's 
final three Terms, emerged almost entirely during the first 
decade of Justice White's judicial tenure-his decade on the 
Warren Court. That divergence, I suggest, resulted less from 
changes in  the views of Byron White than from a 
transformation in important social and political values in the 
mid- to late 1960s. 
My proposed interpretation of Justice White's place on the 
Supreme Court will proceed first by delineating the contours of 
what is labelled "Kennedy liberalism2'-the ideology that 
* Professor of Law, New York University Law School. The author clerked 
for Justice White during the October 1970 Term. The author wishes to thank the 
members of the Legal History Colloquium at New York University for their 
comments and criticisms, especially Chris Eisgruber and Martin Flaherty. The 
author is especially indebted to Norman Williams (J.D., 1995 candidate, New York 
University Law School) for his invaluable help in researching and drafting this 
article. 
1. Pierce O'Donnell, Common Sense and the Constitution: Justice White and 
the Egalitarian Ideal, 58 U .  COLO. L. REV. 433, 436 (1987). 
2. For two examples of White's shift to a more conservative posture during 
the late 1980s, see infia notes 66, 79 and accompanying text. 
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produced Byron White's appointment to the Supreme Court. 
Using a three-part a n a l y ~ i s , ~  I will then show how Justice 
White approached the three values for which history will 
remember the Supreme Court during his period of tenure: 
pragmatism, egalitarianism, and individualism. Far from 
betraying the liberalism embodied by the Kennedy 
administration and epitomized by the early Warren Court, 
Justice White consistently advocated and adhered to Kennedy 
liberalism with its emphasis on pragmatic social reform and its 
unshakable devotion to equality. The only subject on which the 
Justice departed from other liberals was individual rights, but 
this departure did not represent a significant ideological shift 
for John F. Kennedy's first appointee to the high Court. 
Finally, I hope to demonstrate that the Justice's jurisprudential 
philosophy, far from eschewing liberalism, fit well within a 
coherent and recognized strand of liberalism. Byron R. White's 
and John F. Kennedy's liberalism was, I believe, a direct 
descendant of the pragmatic, egalitarian liberalism that lay a t  
the core of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. I t  was a more 
distant descendant of the democratic republicanism of James 
Madison and ultimately of the community-driven, republican 
political theories of Hume and Montesquieu. It was a liberalism 
that other Justices, however, did not fully accept-a liberalism 
a t  odds with the romantic individualism of Rousseau and Kant 
on which other liberals like Justice Brennan ultimately built 
their jurisprudential edifice. 
Byron White, who served as Deputy Attorney General from 
1961 to 1962, was very much a part of the Kennedy team in 
the Department of Justice; in fact, he as much as anyone put 
the team together? Thus, even in the absence of direct 
evidence, there is every reason to believe that Justice White 
shared the Kennedy administration's liberal values. 
What were those values? First was an unapologetic and 
undying belief in rationalism. The Kennedy team possessed 
enormous faith in the ability of people to resolve problems 
3. See Robert C. Post, William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, in THE 
WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL ND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 123 (Mark Tushnet ed., 
1993). 
4 .  See VICTOR S .  NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 163 (1971); ARTHUR M. 
SCHLESINGER, J ., ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES 237 (1978). 
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through reason. Members of the administration had "an 
abiding faith in man as a rational being committing rational 
acts,"5 and those working in the Justice Department "cared 
deeply and professionally about the laww6 as the rational 
means to achieve social change. As is shown by Robert 
Kennedy's two weeks of telephone conversations with Governor 
Ross Barnett of Mississippi concerning the registration of 
James Meredith at the University of Mississippi,? Kennedy 
assumed that confrontation should be avoided, that mediation 
was preferable to  coercion, and that reasonable people could 
always work things out.8 They understood that law, 
administered in a practical and sympathetic fashion by 
evenhanded officials, was essential to compromise. 
As an attorney in private practice in Colorado during the 
19509, Byron White had seemed to his partners to be "a 
pragmatic problem solver? and he adhered to his pragmatism 
upon joining the Kennedy administration. His pragmatism in 
the Justice Department is evidenced by a key episode in the 
Kennedy years-the appointment of Burke Marshall as 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. White, who played 
an active role in the appointment, "thought that the 
Administration ought to  locate the primary leadership in the 
civil rights fight outside the Department of Justice. . . . so that 
initiative, aggressive action, education, persuasion should 
emanate from a different source than the Department."" 
White viewed the Department solely as "a law enforcement 
agency and speaking for law and order is to speak for a very 
strong position but when you mix law enforcement with other 
things . . . . the two together . . . [become] less effective."" 
Robert Kennedy agreed. For that reason, Kennedy "didn't want 
to have someone in the Civil Rights Division who was dealing 
not from fact but was dealing from emotion . . . [or] in the 
interest of a Negro or a group of Negroes or a group of those 
who were interested in civil rights."12 White expressed the 
5. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 233 (1972) (referring 
to Robert S. McNamara). 
6. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 237. 
7. The conversations are reported in NAVASKY, supra note 4, at 165-234. 
8. See id. at 164-65. 
9. Donald W. Hoagland, Byron White as a Practicing Lawyer in Colorado, 58 
U. COLO. L. REV. 365, 367 (1987). 
10. NAVASKY, supra note 4, at 161. 
11. Id. 
12. ROBERT KENNEDY: IN HIS OWN WORDS 78-79 (Edwin 0. Guthman & 
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same idea when he commented that "it would be more 
interesting to get a first-class lawyer who would do the job in a 
technically proficient way that would be defensible in 
court-that Southerners would not think of as a vendetta, but 
as an even-handed application of the law."13 As an aide to 
Kennedy added, "As Bob and White looked ahead to the role 
the Justice Department would play in the gathering struggle 
over civil rights . . . they felt the only proper course for the 
Department would be to proceed in strict accordance with the 
law, avoiding any appearance of pitting one social point of view 
against another."14 Such an approach might not lead to a 
triumphant victory for any overarching vision of equality, but it  
would produce practical advances toward equal civil rights. 
All of this is not to claim that Robert Kennedy and Byron 
White did not favor the cause of civil rights; they clearly did 
favor it. As Robert Kennedy understood it, one of his main 
duties in life was to "be kind to others that are less fortunate 
than we,"15 and therefore he and White searched for someone 
"sensitive . . . to the cause of equal rights," even though "not 
identified with it."16 But, while Kennedy and White believed 
in the moral good of equality, they understood the success of 
the civil rights movement to depend upon the political process, 
not the law. 
Robert Kennedy decided early on that the best way he and 
the Justice Department could help the civil rights cause was to 
enforce the federally guaranteed right of blacks to vote.'? As 
he explained, he "felt strongly that this was where the most 
good could be accomplished. . . . From the vote, from 
participation in the elections, flow all other rights far, far more 
easily. A great deal could be accomplished internally within a 
state if the Negroes participated in elections and v~ted." '~ For 
this reason, the Attorney General encouraged civil rights 
leaders to focus their equality drive on voting rights and 
Jeffrey Shulman eds., 1988) [hereinafter KENNEDY]. 
13. NAVASKY, supra note 4, at  162. On White's role in the Marshall 
appointment, see SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, a t  288-89. 
14. NAVASKY, supra note 4, a t  52. 
15. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at  612. The other duty was to "love our 
country." Id. 
16. NAVASKY, supra note 4, a t  162. 
17. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 290-91. 
18. KENNEDY, supra note 12, a t  102-03. 
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assisted them with a six-fold increase in the number of voter- 
registration suits filed by the Justice Department.'' 
Promoting the right of blacks to vote was consistent with a 
broader faith in the right to vote and the democratic process in  
general. The Kennedy team was quite sympathetic, for 
example, with the one-person-one-vote line of cases growing out 
of the 1961 precedent of Baker v. C ~ r r . ~ '  The most hesitant 
member of the team was Solicitor General Archibald Cox, but 
the rest of the Department of Justice team pushed him hard in 
the direction of urging judicial enforcement of equal voting 
r ighk2l  Byron White supported this effort during his stay in 
the Department, arguing with Cox that the Government had to 
take an amicus posture in favor of the result to which the 
Court ultimately came in Baker.22 White also took a stand in 
favor of the free functioning of the democratic process when he 
wrote President Kennedy a memo urging that strict limits be 
placed on invocations of the doctrine of executive privilege. He 
maintained that "Congress's need for the information" should 
be taken into account in order to make "meaningful 
investigation" possible and thereby counteract the tendency of 
the executive branch "to hide its errors."23 
In short, the Department of Justice team that Byron White 
assembled on behalf of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy 
fully shared two characteristics associated with the Warren 
Court's liberalism: pragmatism and egalitarianism. White 
himself, of course, was a strong proponent at Justice of both of 
these values. Moreover, both White and the Kennedy Justice 
Department were strong proponents of a third value: 
democratization of the electoral process and democratic 
decisionmaking by the legislative branch. In pursuing these 
values, the Kennedy team cast itself firmly in the mold of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, reviving for the last time 
the mixture of pragmatism, equality, and democracy that  was 
its hallmark. At least during his brief stint at the Justice 
Department, Byron R. White had planted himself squarely 
within the tradition of New Deal liberalism. 
19. See NAVASKY, supra note 4, at 118, 204. 
20. 369 US. 186 (1962). 
21. See NAVASKY, supra note 4, at 297-322. 
22. See id. at 301-02. 
23. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 381. 
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When Charles E. Whittaker resigned from the Supreme 
Court in the spring of 1962, President Kennedy appointed 
Byron R. White to replace him because everyone participating 
in the nomination process perceived White as a loyal member 
of the Kennedy team. There were two other serious candidates 
for the position-William H. Hastie and Paul Freund-but 
Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William 0. Douglas 
found both of them too conservative and hence obje~tionable.~~ 
As Warren said of Hastie, "He's not a liberal, and he'll be 
opposed to all the measures that we are interested in."25 The 
opposition of Warren and Douglas killed consideration of 
Hastie and Freund, and when Senator Richard Russell 
threatened to bring a delegation to the White House to seek 
the appointment of a conservative, President Kennedy moved 
quickly to appoint to the Court his liberal Deputy Attorney 
General, Byron R. White.26 
11. JUSTICE WHITE AND PRAGMATISM 
Upon ascending to the Supreme Court bench, Justice 
White continued to make decisions concerning the substance of 
the law not on grounds of abstract philosophical theory or 
technical legal doctrine, but on the basis of "a pragmatic 
estimate as t o  how effective [his approach] would be.7727 As he 
wrote in his 1966 dissent in Miranda u. A r i ~ o n a , ~ ~  
constitutional decisions "cannot rest alone on syllogism, 
metaphysics or some ill-defined notions of natural justice"; the 
Supreme Court and each of its Justices had a continuing duty 
"to inquire into the advisability of its end product in terms of 
the long-range interest of the country."2g Or, as he maintained 
a decade later with a quotation fkom the writings of Justice 
Cardozo, "[Tlhe juristic philosophy of the common law is at 
bottom the philosophy of pragmatism. . . . The rule that 
functions well produces a title deed to re~ognition."~~ 
24. See KENNEDY, supm note 12, at 115-16; SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 
376-77. 
25. KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 115. 
26. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 377-78. 
27. William E. Nelson, Deference and the Limits to Deference in the 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Byron R. White, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 347, 
348 (1987). 
28. 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
29. Id. at 531-32. 
30. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 403 (1974) (Cardozo, J., 
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Justice White's "focus on the actual operation of the 
law"31 rather than on theory and technicality is so clear and 
so widely accepted that no need exists to dwell on it at length. 
Just  a few examples will suffice. One example from the Warren 
Court era was his opinion concurring in the judgment in 
Griswold v. Connecti~ut,~' where the Justice refused to join in 
the opinions proclaiming a constitutional right to privacy and 
debating its source; instead, he decided the case on the wholly 
practical ground that he could not "see how the ban on the use 
of contraceptives by married couples in any way reinforce[d] 
the State's ban on illicit sexual  relationship^."^^ Similarly, 
Justice White wrote his 1965 opinion in Swain u. Alabama34 
not because he felt compelled by precedent but because he 
wanted to give a practical warning to "prosecutors that using 
peremptories to exclude blacks [from juries] on the assumption 
that no black juror could fairly judge a black defendant would 
violate the Equal Protection C l a ~ s e " ; ~ ~  and when he learned 
that Swain was not giving that warning, he did not feel that 
precedent or legal theory precluded him from joining in 
overruling it.36 Finally, in Furman v. Georgia:' White relied 
upon "common sense and experience" to hold the death penalty 
unconstitutional, since "its imposition" had become a "pointless 
and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions 
to any discernible social or public purpose."38 
In short, Justice White was part of a generation trained in 
legal realism and sociological jurisprudence, and, as such, he 
was far more interested in the practical ramifications than the 
theoretical soundness of Supreme Court opinions. White 
thereby fit into a long line of twentieth-century liberals, 
beginning with Louis D. Brandeis, who were willing to ignore 
precedent and alter doctrine in the interest of progressive 
social change. 
dissenting) (quoting SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN ATHAN CARDOZO 149 
(Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947)). 
31. Post, supra note 3, at 135. 
32. 381 US.  479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
33. Id. at 505. 
34. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
35. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 101 (1986) (White, J., concurring), 
modified by Powers v. Ohio, 499 US.  400 (1991). 
36. Id. at 100-01. 
37. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
38. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring). 
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111. JUSTICE WHITE AND EGALITARIANISM 
Much has been written of Justice White's views on 
affirmative action and civil rights.3g Justice White's alignment 
with the more conservative members of the Court often has 
been cited to demonstrate his jurisprudential move toward a 
more restricted involvement by the federal courts in the 
enforcement of civil rights. Contrary to  this widely held belief, 
the Justice's opinions in racial equality cases during his thirty- 
one years on the Supreme Court were entirely consistent with 
the concept of liberalism forged during the New Deal and 
predominant at the Kennedy Justice Department. 
To begin, during the Warren Court era Justice White 
typically voted with Justice Breman and other liberals on 
racial equality issues. In leading cases like Goss u. Board of 
Education," Grifin v. County School Board:' and Green v. 
County School Justice White joined a unanimous 
Court in its efforts to  make the promise of school desegregation 
a reality, and in two important cases in which state and local 
governments adopted legislation making housing integration 
more difficult, he authored important 8-1 and 5-4 opinions 
striking the legislation down.43 When the Court began to  
divide during the early years of the Burger Court, White 
remained with the pro-integration forces in all the main 
constitutional cases-Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Edu~ation:~ Palmer v. Thompson:' Milliken v. Br~dley;~ 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
C ~ r p . , ~ '  and University of California Regents v. 
B~kke~~-although now, sometimes, in dissent. His position, 
first articulated in Palmer and then adopted by the Court in 
Washington u. Davis4' and the Columbuss0 and Daytons1 
39. See, e.g., Lance Liebman, Justice White and Affirmative Action, 58 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 471 (1987); O'Donnell, supra note 1. 
40. 373 U.S. 683 (1963). 
41. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
42. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
43. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 
US. 369 (1967). 
44. 402 U.S. 1 (1971); accord Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
45. 403 U.S. 217, 240 (1971) (White, J., dissenting). 
46. 418 U.S. 717, 762 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). 
47. 429 U.S. 252, 272 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). 
48. 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
49. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
50. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). 
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school desegregation cases, was that "official denigrations" of 
blacks and "expression[s] of official policy that Negroes are 
unfit to associate with whites" are "at war with the Equal 
Protection Clause"52 and justify full-scale remedial 
intervention by the 
White also remained strongly committed on the Court t o  
the position he had held earlier at the Justice Department in 
respect to voting rights.54 In Gray v.  sander^,^^ Wesberry v. 
 sander^,^^ and ultimately Reynolds v. Sins,5' he joined a 
series of majority opinions that produced the one-person-one- 
vote rule in legislative apportionment cases. Later in the 
Warren years he joined a majority opinion written by Justice 
Brennan requiring states to "make a good-faith effort t o  
achieve precise mathematical equality" in congressional 
districtin$' and authored another majority opinion extending 
the equal representation requirement to units of local 
go~ernment.~~ 
The Justice failed to commit himself to a broad reading of 
the egalitarian principle in only two major cases during the 
Warren years: Swain v. Alabama,6o where he wrote the 
51. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
52. Palmer, 403 US. at  240-41 (White, J., dissenting). 
53. See generally Nelson, supra note 27, at 355-58. 
54. Recall that White, while he was Deputy Attorney General, was part of a 
group that persuaded Solicitor General Archibald Cox to intervene strongly on 
behalf of equality in Bahr  v. Carr. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. 
55. 372 US. 368 (1963). 
56. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
57. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
58. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969). 
59. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
60. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
His position in Swain, however, appears to be an extension of his view as Deputy 
Attorney General that "the occurrence of crimen would not alone "be a sufficient 
reason to displace local law enforcement officials" with federal authorities; in 
addition, there would need to be "some solid evidence that local law enforcement 
people were not going to live up to their responsibilities." Deposition of Justice 
Byron R. White, Peck v. United States, 76 Civ. 93 (CES), S.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 1982, 
pp. 8-9. Similarly, the statistical showing in Swain that blacks were 
underrepresented on juries did not alone convince White that they were subjects of 
purposeful discrimination, and thus he was not prepared to limit prosecutorial use 
of peremptory challenges against black prospective jurors. Nonetheless, he adhered 
to the basic anti-discrimination principle in Swain and hoped that the case would 
warn "prosecutors that using peremptories to exclude blacks on the assumption 
that no black juror could fairly judge a black defendant would violate the Equal 
Protection Clause." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 101 (1986) (White, J., 
concurring). And, when prosecutors failed to heed Swain's warning, White "agree[d] 
with the Court that the time hdd]  come" for the case to be overruled. Id. at 102. 
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majority opinion which he later voted to overrule in Batson v. 
Kent~cky,~' and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,"' where he 
joined Justice Harlan's dissent. I cannot account for White's 
position in Jones except, perhaps, on one of the theories stated 
in Harlan's dissent-that in view of the recent congressional 
adoption of fair housing legislation, it was unnecessary to 
reinterpret the Thirteenth Amendment in ways that would cast 
much existing Supreme Court doctrine into Having 
joined an opinion giving a narrow construction to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, he continued to support a narrow 
construction of that Act in cases such as Runyon u. McCrary6* 
and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.65 In his dissent in 
Runyon, where the Court held that a refusal by a private 
school to admit black students solely on account of their race 
violated a statutory prohibition against racial discrimination in 
the making and enforcement of contracts, Justice White argued 
that both the legislative history of the statute and "common 
sense" precluded such an expansive construction of the 1866 
act? In his view, there was a stark difference between racial 
discrimination practiced by the government and that practiced 
by private individuals. While the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause addressed the former in very broad 
fashion, Congress, with several very notable but specific 
 exception^,^^ had left the latter unregulated. Consistent with 
his pragmatic and deferential approach to judicial 
interpretation, White felt that the "sensitive policy 
considerations" involved in determining which areas of private 
associations to  regulate left it "a task appropriate for the 
Legislature, not for the Judiciary."' In the absence of a more 
explicit statute passed by Congress, White was unwilling to 
involve the Court in such a wholesale transformation of 
American society. 
61. 476 U.S. 79, 101 (1986) (White, J., concurring). 
62. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
63. Id. at 477-79 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
64. 427 U.S. 160, 192 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
65. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
66. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 211 (White, J., dissenting). 
67. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, $ 701, 78 Stat. 253-66 
(current version, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. $9 2000e-2000e17 (1988)); Fair Housing 
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81-90 (currently codified, as amended, at 
42 U.S.C. $9 3601-3631 (1988)). 
68. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 212 (White, J., dissenting). 
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Although White wrote in dissent in Runyon, his views on 
this issue gained the support of a majority of the Court during 
the early years of the Rehnquist Court. In Patterson, Justice 
Kennedy, while refusing to overrule Runyon, held, in an 
opinion joined by Justice White, that the same statutory 
provision construed in Runyon did not prohibit racial 
harassment on the job. Perhaps taking heed of Justice White's 
dissent in Runyon, Congress, in the wake of Patterson and 
other civil rights opinions that restricted the scope of civil 
rights protection, enacted legislation in 1991 that overturned 
Patterson and gave clear guidance to the federal judiciary that 
racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of private 
contracts was prohibited?' 
Although Justice White's opinions in civil rights cases 
during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts are often cited as 
evidence of a gradual conservative shift in the Justice's views, I 
suggest that Justice White's approach to civil rights 
adjudication, particularly his opinions in affirmative action and 
voting rights cases, was consistent with the egalitarian values 
of the Kennedy Justice Department. Far from retreating from 
the judicial protection of civil rights, Justice White remained 
committed to eradicating governmental barriers to equal rights, 
but as the civil rights agenda embraced a more expansive role 
for government in remedying the legacy of racial 
discrimination, Justice White's pragmatism and unerring faith 
in the political process's ability to  address social problems led 
the Justice to join Court opinions that prodded Congress to  
address via legislation what, in his view, the judiciary could 
not resolve via court order. A quick survey of Justice White's 
opinions in affirmative action and voting rights cases after the 
Warren Court era reveals this consistent and, I argue, 
egalitarian approach to civil rights enforcement. 
To his last days on the Court, Justice White remained an 
ardent supporter of giving broad construction to twentieth- 
century federal legislation that prohibited racial discrimination 
in employment and housing. His approach to this legislation 
was markedly different from his reading of the 1866 law. 
Although the Justice, as his opinions in Runyon and Patterson 
indicated, felt that it was the duty of Congress t o  address via 
the political process the complex problems presented in 
69. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, g 101, 105 Stat. 1071-81 
(currently codified at 42 U.S.C. 8 1981 (Supp. I11 1991)). 
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defining the appropriate scope and remedy for discrimination 
in  the private sector, White was unwilling to side with 
conservatives on the Rehnquist Court who invariably pursued 
narrow interpretations of statutes after Congress had enacted 
others. Thus, in one of the last civil rights cases in  which the 
Justice participated, White joined the dissent in St. Mary's 
Honor Center u. Hicksp7O which raised the threshold for the 
burden of proof that a victim of employment discrimination had 
to satisfy in order to prevail in  a Title VII claim. The dissent 
recognized that it was "unfair and utterly impractical" to 
require victims of discrimination to meet this higher burden, 
particularly since the sole beneficiaries of the ruling were 
employers "who have been found to have given false evidence 
in a court of law."71 Moreover, the dissent did not ignore the 
practical ramifications of the majority's refusal to read Title 
VII capaciously. The Court's approach "promote[d] longer trials 
and more pre-trial discovery, threatening increased expense 
and delay in Title VII litigation for both plaintiffs and 
defendants, and increased burdens on the judiciary."72 
Justice White also sided with the liberals in every major 
affirmative action case questioning the power of Congress and 
the states to adopt race-conscious remedies to redress past 
discrimination. When the Court confronted the constitutionality 
of affirmative action in Regents of the University of California 
u. B ~ k k e , ? ~  Justice White authored, together with Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, a joint opinion which 
denied that the Constitution mandates color-blindness and held 
that "Government may take race into account when it acts not 
to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy 
disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudi~e."~~ 
70. 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2756 (1993) (Souter, J., joined by White, Blackmun, and 
Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
71. Id. at  2758, 2763 (Souter, J., joined by White, Blackmun, and Stevens, 
JJ., dissenting). 
72. Id. at 2763 (Souter, J., joined by White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., 
dissenting). 
73. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding the special admissions program administered 
by a state university medical school whereby a specific number of spots in the 
entering class were reserved for racial minorities violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause). Justice Powell announced the judgment of 
the Court and delivered an opinion which, to the extent that i t  reversed the 
California Supreme Court's determination that the University could never take race 
into account in its admissions criteria, commanded a majority of the Court. Id. at  
320 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. a t  326 (opinion of Breman, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, JJ.). 
74. Id. at 325 (Breman, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., 
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Recounting the nation's long history of providing separate but 
unequal educational opportunities to racial minorities, the 
Justices explained that the affirmative action program adopted 
by the medical school of the University of California at Davis 
"does not simply advance less qualified applicants; rather, it 
compensates applicants, who it is uncontested are fully 
qualified to study medicine, for educational disadvantages 
which it was reasonable to  conclude were a product of state- 
fostered di~crimination."~~ 
Two years later in Fulliloue v. Klut~nick,~~ Justice White 
joined Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion upholding the 
authority of Congress to adopt legislation requiring a 10% set- 
aside of federal funds for minority businesses on local public 
works projects. Unlike the affirmative action program 
challenged in Bakke, which was adopted and administered by 
an instrumentality of the state, the congressionally mandated 
set-aside for minority-owned businesses upheld in Fullilove was 
a creature of the federal government. Lest anyone doubt the 
broad authority granted Congress to remedy the legacy of 
racial discrimination through the use of race-conscious 
provisions, the plurality announced that "[ilt is fundamental 
that in no organ of government, state or federal, does there 
repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the 
Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with 
competence and authority t o  enforce equal protection 
 guarantee^."^^ Justice White remained committed to this 
broad construction of federal authority to adopt race-conscious 
remedies up to his last years on the Court, when, in Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC," three years prior to his 
retirement, he joined Justice Brennan's broad affirmation of 
the power of a federal agency, pursuant to congressional 
authorization, to adopt policies designed to increase minority 
participation-in this case in radio and television broadcasting 
ownership. 
Although Justice White gave great deference to  action by 
the states and the national government t o  redress past 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
75. Id. at 375-76 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
76. 448 US. 448, 453 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White 
Powell, JJ.). 
77. Id. at 483 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.). 
78. 497 US. 547 (1990). 
JJ., 
and 
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discrimination through affirmative action, the Justice was less 
tolerant of attempts by local governments to do the same thing. 
In City of Richmond u. J.A. Croson Co." Justice White joined 
the Court majority holding that Richmond's minority set-aside 
program for city-funded public works projects, modeled upon 
the federal government's program upheld by the Court in 
Fulliloue, violated the right of non-minority contractors to 
participate in government contracts. Although Congress had 
been explicitly empowered by the Civil War Amendments to 
enforce the mandate of racial equality, the fact that "Congress 
may identify and redress the  effects of society-wide 
discrimination does not mean, a fortiori, the States and their 
political subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are 
appr~priate.'"~ Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment imposed 
"clear limits on the States' use of race as a criterion for 
legislative action," since the Amendment reflected "a distrust of 
state legislative enactments based on race."" Without any 
compelling evidence that Richmond was responding to 
discrimination in city public works contracting, the fact that a 
city, in which blacks constituted 50% of the population and 
held a majority of the city council seats, had adopted a policy 
designed to assist black-owned business prompted concern that 
a political majority was acting to the disadvantage of a 
minority-this time 
Justice White also remained faithful throughout his tenure 
on the Court to the Kennedy Justice Department's belief that 
equality for racial minorities could best be achieved through 
political participation-through voting. A quick review of 
Justice White's approach to the Court's voting rights cases 
indicates that White never veered from his steadfast support 
for a broad federal guarantee of the right of racial minorities to 
participate in the electoral process and to have their votes 
counted. 
In United Jewish Organizations u. Justice White, 
writing for a plurality of the Court, upheld against 
constitutional attack a state legislative redistricting plan that 
used racial considerations in drawing district lines so as to 
79. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
80. Id. at 490. 
81. Id. at 491. 
82. Id. at 495-96. 
83. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
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comply with the Voting Rights A d 4  The effect of the plan 
was to divide a large Hasidic Jewish community in Brooklyn 
into two state Assembly districts, one of which contained a 
majority non-white population. The Justice found that "the 
Constitution does not prevent a State subject to the Voting 
Rights Act from deliberately creating or preserving black 
majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its 
reapportionment plan complies with 5 5? Although the plan 
could be justified as a remedial measure, he thought that "[tlhe 
permissible use of racial criteria is not confined to eliminating 
the effects of past discriminatory districting or appor- 
ti~nment."'~ Moreover, the Hasidic community had not been 
denied a fair and equal opportunity to participate in the 
electoral process, nor did the plan "minimize or unfairly cancel 
out white voting strength."" White felt that a state, seeking 
'Yo alleviate the consequences of racial voting at the polls and 
to achieve a fair allocation of political power between white and 
nonwhite voters," could constitutionally "attempt to prevent 
racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted by creating 
districts that will afford fair representation" to these 
underrepresented Emboldened by the Court's 
decision in United Jewish Organizations, Congress amended 
the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to effectively mandate the 
creation of congressional districts in which racial minorities 
constitute a majority of the p o p u l a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Justice White served long enough to see the Rehnquist 
Court retreat from the broad affirmation of congressional power 
84. Congress, in addressing the variety of ways that recalcitrant state 
legislatures could draw district lines to dilute minority voting power and thereby 
prevent the election of minority representatives, passed the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 which, among other things, required certain states to submit reapportionment 
plans to the Attorney General for approval. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-110, 5 5, 79 Stat. 439 (currently codified, as  amended, a t  42 U.S.C. 8 1973(c) 
(1988)). 
85. 430 U.S. at  161 (opinion of White, J.). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at  165 (opinion of White, J.). White explicitly noted that even under 
the challenged plan "[tlhe percentage of districts with nonwhite majorities [(30%)] 
was less than the percentage of nonwhites in the county as a whole (35%)." Id. at  
163 (opinion of White, J.). "Thus, even if voting in the county occurred strictly 
according to race, whites would not be underrepresented relative to their share of 
the population." Id. at  166 (opinion of White, J.). 
88. Id. at  167, 168 (opinion of White, J.). 
89. Voting Rights Ad Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 5 3, 96 Stat. 
134 (currently codiiied at  42 U.S.C. 5 197300) (1988)). 
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articulated in United Jewish Organizations, though the Justice 
remained steadfast in his commitment to enhancing the 
political participation of historically underrepresented or 
disenfranchised groups. In his last opinion on the Court, 
Justice White dissented from the Court's holding in Shaw u. 
Reno:' where the Court ruled that a reapportionment scheme 
designed t o  create a minority congressional seat may violate 
the Equal Protection Clause if i t  could be understood only as 
an  effort to segregate voters into separate districts on the basis 
of race. Despite the  fact t ha t  the  North Carolina 
reapportionment plan challenged in Shaw still ensured that 
whites, who constituted 76% of the total population and 78% of 
the voting age population, retained a voting majority in ten of 
twelve (83%) of the State's congressional districts:' the Court 
felt that the redistricting plan bore "an uncomfortable 
resemblance to political a~artheid."'~ White chastised the 
Court for comparing this remedial political reform to 
affirmative action since "remedying a Voting Rights Act 
violation does not involve preferential treatment. It involves, 
instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and to provide 
minority voters with an effective voice in the political 
process."93 Consistent with Robert Kennedy's faith in political 
participation as the principal means for blacks and other racial 
minorities to achieve eq~al i ty , '~  Justice White distinguished 
efforts to segregate minority voters so as to dilute their voting 
strength-the political apartheid which troubled the 
Court-from efforts mandated by the Voting Rights Act, which 
did not seek to entrench the political strength of the majority 
but to increase the political influence of minorities who had 
historically been disenfranchised. In fact, White reproached the 
Court for "unnecessarily hinder[ing] to some extent a State's 
voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority 
representation.yyg5 
Just ice  White's limited departures i n  s ta tutory 
construction cases from the egalitarian agenda of progressives 
are trivial in comparison with the vast areas of the law-school 
90. 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2834 (1993) (White, J., dissenting). 
91. Id. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting). 
92. Id. at 2827. 
93. Id. at 2842-43 (White, J., dissenting). 
94. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
95. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting). 
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desegregation, affirmative action, voting rights, and 
reapportionment-where the Justice consistently supported the 
principle of equality. Justice White, both during the Warren 
Court era and during the subsequent Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts, remained faithful to the Kennedy liberalism that 
favored the political, not judicial, process as the best means t o  
accomplish the difficult task of making "equal protection of the 
laws" more than an empty promise. Moreover, the Justice gave 
broad latitude to  congressional efforts to  prohibit private 
discrimination and remedy the legacy of past discrimination 
through remedial programs such as affirmative action. 
IV. JUSTICE WHITE AND INDIVIDUALISM 
The Warren Court, through its doctrine of applying to  the 
states the constitutional protections embodied in the Bill of 
Rights and its decisions such as Baker v. Carr that rested 
legislative apportionment on population rather than historical 
political boundaries, simultaneously repudiated a broad 
conception of states' rights and developed a jurisprudence 
centered upon the protection of individual rights. Like Chief 
Justice Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan, but 
unlike Justices Felix Frankfurter and John M. Harlan, justice 
White demonstrated little sympathy for states' rights, which "is 
a form of cultural pluralism that valorizes the diversity of local 
cultures."g6 Moreover, he generally found it "incomprehensible 
to  appeal" to states' rights "as a reason not to protect 
individual rights."" Like Warren and Brennan, Justice White 
was a consistently ardent nationalist. 
White first expressed his nationalism in a dissenting 
opinion in an important 1963 preemption case, Florida Lime & 
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul.g8 More significantly during the 
Warren Court era, he joined majority opinions authored by 
Justice Brennan in three cases that had a profound 
nationalizing impact: New York Times Co. v. S u l l i ~ a n , ~ ~  which 
nationalized the law of libel; Fay v. Noia,loO which removed 
bars to  habeas corpus proceedings in federal courts instituted 
96. Post, supm note 3, at 126. 
97. Id. 
98. 373 U.S. 132, 159 (1963) (White, J., dissenting). 
99. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
100. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 
(1991). 
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by prisoners in state cu~tody;'~' and Dombrowski v. 
Pfister,lo2 which expanded federal jurisdiction in civil rights 
cases. As another scholar has observed, "Justice White 
consistently has supported broad-ranging federal authority and 
vigorous institutions of national government" and "has attached 
great importance to national unification, and the supremacy 
and uniformity of federal law."lo3 
Justice White, in short, consistently strove to  undermine 
aberrant, localistic policies obstructing the advancement of 
individuals. In pursuit of this individualist goal, he authored 
and joined opinions limiting the power of local communities 
and enhancing the power of the national government. Even 
during the Rehnquist Court era, Justice White, writing for the 
majority in Missouri v. Jenkins,la4 affirmed the power of the 
federal judiciary to order tax increases in order to  fund 
constitutionally mandated school desegregation plans. In his 
view, the ability of a federal court to direct a local authority to 
raise taxes "is plainly a judicial act within the power of a 
federal court," and any state statute preventing the local 
authority from levying the additional taxes disregards "the 
obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, 
to  fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on 
them."'" Justice White also supported legislative appor- 
tionment schemes that destroyed the power of localities in the 
legislative process and instead gave equal voice to every 
individual. He worked t o  make the political branches of 
government effective institutions for the advancement of 
individual well-being. 
Thus, White, like Warren and B r e ~ a n ,  was a nationalist, 
but unlike them he was not a complete individualist. There 
was another side to Warren's and Breman's individualism-its 
opposition to governmental authority-that Justice White never 
shared. When the interests of a particular individual came into 
conflict with the interests of those individuals who had 
effectively gained control of the instruments of government, 
liberals like Justice Breman generally created individual 
101. But compare Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316-17 (1989), where White 
concurred in a judgment of the Court creating new bars to habeas relief. 
102. 380 US. 479 (1965). 
103. Jonathan D. Varat, Justice White and the Breadth and Allocation of 
Federal Authority, 58 U .  COLO. L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1987). 
104. 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
105. Id. at 55, 58. 
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rights that acted as trumps over government a~thority.''~ 
Justice White, in contrast, never adopted this anti- 
authoritarian stance. 
The Supreme Court's controversial forays into the 
expansion of individual rights under the rubric of substantive 
due process never received Justice White's support. In Griswold 
the Justice rejected resting the decision on a broad conception 
of unenumerated rights protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment; rather he based his vote to 
overturn Connecticut's anti-contraception law on its utter 
inability to achieve the professed goals of the State.''' To 
Justice White, the problem with the Court's willingness to 
expand constitutional rights was that the political process, not 
the judiciary, was a far better forum for balancing the 
competing interests involved in defining the scope of rights. 
The primary evil lay in the fact that judicial recognition of a 
constitutional right automatically discarded the careful 
compromises reached by political resolution of the issues in 
state legislatures. In the absence of an explicit Constitutional 
provision upon which to rely, Justice White refused to accept 
the idea that nine Justices of the Supreme Court had the 
legitimate authority to set aside the considered judgment of 
state legislatures representing, as they do, the will of the 
people. Regardless of his own personal views, the Justice 
refused to impose his own moral hierarchy upon state 
legislatures, even if he did agree, for instance, that women 
should have the right to undergo an abortion. 
Justice White gave strong voice to these views in his 
dissent in Roe u. Wade,lo8 a case that still divides the nation 
and the Court. As the Justice wrote, referring to  the Court's 
favoring of women's reproductive freedom over the State's 
interest in the life of the unborn, "[wlhether or not I might 
agree with that marshaling of values, I can in no event join the 
Court's judgment because I find no constitutional warrant for 
imposing such an order of priorities on the people and 
legislatures of the  state^."'^^ "I find nothing in the language 
or history of the Constitution to support the Court's 
106. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
107. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
108. 410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting), modified by Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
109. Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting). 
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judgments," and therefore, "[tlhis issue, for the most part, 
should be left with the people and to the political processes the 
people have devised to  govern their While "[als an 
exercise of raw judicial power" the Court had the authority to 
invalidate Texas' anti-abortion statute, the Court's 
"improvident and extravagant exercise" of this authority had 
deprived the people of their right "to weigh the relative 
importance of the continued existence and development of the 
fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts 
on the mother, on the other hand.""' As recently as 1992, 
Justice White expressed his willingness to  join three other 
Justices in overturning Roe. 'I2 
Justice White restated his hostility to judicial recognition 
of unenumerated yet fundamental rights, this time while 
writing for a majority of the Court, in Bowers u. Hardwick,l13 
in which the Court held that the Constitution did not protect 
the right of homosexuals to engage in consensual acts of 
sodomy. Noting that "[tlhe Court is most vulnerable and comes 
nearest to  illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made 
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the 
language or design of the Constitution," the Justice was "quite 
unwilling" to announce a "fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy," particularly since other forms of sexual 
conduct such as adultery or incest remain criminal even when 
committed in the home. 114 
White's repudiation of an expansive, rights-oriented 
jurisprudence reflected not only his faith in the democratic 
process and fear of the delegitimatizing effect of judicial 
activism but also his own pragmatic concern that the courts 
were ill-equipped to  undertake the controversial and complex 
inquiries necessary to  identify and articulate the permissible 
scope of democratic legislation and individual rights. White 
repudiated any attempt to  limit the authority of the majority to 
impose particular conceptions of morality as a legitimate basis 
110. Id. at 221, 222 (White, J., dissenting). 
111. Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting). 
112. P l a ~ e d  Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2855 (1992) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., joined by White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part); id. at 2873 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and 
White and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
113. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
114. Id. at 191, 194-96. 
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for legislation. In fact, White recognized in Bowers that the law 
"is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws 
representing essentially moral choices are to  be invalidated . . . 
the courts will be very busy indeed."ll5 Moreover, the overuse 
of the power of judicial review would reduce respect for the 
Court and waste its precious political capital necessary to 
achieve dramatic social reform in other areas, such as school 
desegregation. 
It is important to understand, however, that Byron White's 
rejection of the use of individual rights as trumps over 
government authority did not signal an ideological change from 
when he first- entered government and initially came to the 
Court. In fact, White's deference to the legislative process and 
his concomitant hostility to arguments focusing on 
unenumerated yet fundamental rights reflected the training he 
received as a young student at Yale Law School in the late 
1940s' during the heyday of legal realism and the aftermath of 
the New Deal.'16 Concerned that an imperial judiciary acting 
on its own preconceived notions of fundamental rights posed a 
grave threat to the democratically adopted social and economic 
reforms passed during the New Deal,"' the legal realists 
taught that all legal reasoning reflects the sociological cast of 
the judge. Since every legal decision is therefore tainted by-if 
not entirely a reflection of-the judge's policy preferences, the 
judiciary should defer to  the policy choices made by the 
legislative and executive branches as the democratically elected 
branches of government accountable to the people. In fact, in 
Bowers the Justice acknowledged the Court's need "to assure 
itself and the public that announcing rights not readily 
identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much more than 
the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the 
States and the Federal G~vernment ."~~~ 
In addition to the narrow scope accorded the right to  
privacy, Justice White also disfavored an expansive view of the 
rights of criminal defendants and the rights of radical 
protestors. This is not surprising since the Kennedy Justice 
115. Id. at 196. 
116. See Nelson, supra note 27, at 348; see also LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL 
REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 145-64 (1986) (discussing postwar realism at Yale). 
117. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). But see Nebbia v. New York, 291 
U.S. 502 (1934). 
118. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. 
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Department, of which Byron White was so central a part, also 
had an unfavorable record toward individual rights in these 
two areas. Byron White probably shared at least some 
responsibility for the Department's policies during his year of 
service there, and, on the whole, he continued to vote 
consistently with those policies upon his ascension to the 
bench. 
The Kennedy Justice Department showed little enthusiasm 
for expanding the constitutional rights of persons accused of a 
crime. Indeed, Robert Kennedy himself had built his early 
reputation as counsel to  the Senate's Select Committee on 
Improper Labor Activities, where he had vigorously pursued 
the likes of Dave Beck and Jimmy Hoffallg and "attack[ed] 
organized criminals with weapons and techniques as effective 
as their own."120 In particular, critics of Kennedy's techniques 
accused him of "badgering . . . witnes~es,"'~~ of treating "the 
plea of self-incrimination [als tantamount to a confession of 
guilt," and of holding "hearings for the sole purpose of accusing, 
judging and condemning people."lz2 Even Arthur Schlesinger, 
Kennedy's sympathetic biographer, agreed that Kennedy "had 
displayed an excess of zeal" and "was a man driven by a 
conviction of righteousness, a fanaticism of virtue, [and] a 
certitude about guilt that vaulted over gaps in eviden~e."'~~ 
This tough attitude toward racketeering and other crime, and a 
corresponding tendency to construe narrowly the law of 
criminal constitutional procedure, continued after Kennedy 
became Attorney General, when he proposed that the 
administration support legislation to  permit wiretapping when 
authorized by a federal judge, a proposal that Byron White as 
Deputy Attorney General strongly supported.124 
The K e ~ e d y  Justice Department's faith in the prevailing 
power structure also demonstrated itself in its attitude toward 
the right of blacks--or anyone else for that matter-to engage 
in protests that might offend public sensibilities. The Kennedy 
119. See generally SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 137-69. 
120. Id. at 169 (quoting Robert Kennedy). 
121. Id. at 149 (quoting George M. Belknap to Robert F. Kennedy, Mar. 8, 
1957, JPK Papers). 
122. Id. at 188 (quoting Alexander M. Bickel, Robert F. Kennedy: The Case 
Against Him for Attorney General, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 9, 1961). 
123. Id. at 189. 
124. See NAVASKY, supra note 4, at 74-75; SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 270- 
71. 
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Justice Department had little understanding of the functions of 
protest or how to deal with it, and accordingly the Department 
did a terrible job providing federal protection for civil rights 
demonstrators in the South. The position of the Justice 
Department was that state governments had the duty to 
protect citizens-including black citizens-from violence, and 
accordingly the Department routinely negotiated with state and 
local officials to provide protection rather than use the F.B.I. or 
the army for that purpose.'25 Officials like Burke Marshall 
"were very concerned about the complex . . . problems implied 
in the use of federal force," even when they "could have written 
an  executive order permitting a n  occupation" of a southern 
state by the military. They found use of the military "as a 
practical matter . . . impossible" and as "a policy matter . . . 
~ndesirable." '~~ Nicholas Katzenbach thought it "all very well 
to move troops in" but then wondered "how . . . you get them 
o~t ," '~ '  while Byron White's close friend, Louis Oberdorfer, 
thought "[~Jivilian authority ought to avoid the use of troops 
like the plague." Troops were "an insult to the people" and set 
"a precedent for some less civilized President to use in  a 
tyrannical way. "Iz8 
Death and mayhem resulted among civil rights workers on 
many occasions from the absence of federal protection, and the 
"unbelievable position of confidence" which the Kennedy Justice 
Department had maintained "in t he  minds of t h e  
~ppressed" '~  rapidly eroded. When several black leaders, 
including Jerome Smith, a CORE official who had been 
bludgeoned by southern police, met in 1963 with Robert 
Kennedy and Burke Marshall, they reported that  begging for 
federal protection while fighting for the American dream of 
equal rights made them "nauseous,*'3o while Smith 
acknowledged he would "[n]e~er"'~' serve in a war on behalf 
of the United States. When Kennedy reported his shock at 
these statements, the black leaders, in turn, "were shocked that  
he was shocked."'32 From that point on the meeting 
125. See NAVASKY, supra note 4, at 119-20, 164-67. 
126. Id. at 198. 
127. Id. at 198-99. 
128. Id. at 199. 
129. Id. at 204. 
130. Id. at 113. 
131. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 332. 
132. NAVASKY, supm note 4, at 113. 
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deteriorated into a "violent, emotional verbal assault" on 
Kennedy1= with the blacks stating that Kennedy could not 
"understand what this young man is saying"'54 and Kennedy 
feeling that the black leaders "didn't want to  talk" about facts 
but were all "emotion, hysteria-they stood up and 
orated-they cursed-some of them wept and left the 
room."'35 In his years as Attorney General, Robert Kennedy 
simply could not understand what this fear and distrust of 
government was about. 
Once elevated to the Supreme Court, Justice White 
continued to adhere to the attitudes on criminal procedure and 
radical protest that had been prevalent in the Justice 
Department during his brief stint as Deputy Attorney General. 
As a result, those who had hoped that Justice White, as 
President Kennedy's first appointee to the Supreme Court, 
would regularly side with Chief Justice Earl Warren in 
important cases were quickly disillusioned. A mere two months 
after his appointment, he wrote his first major dissent to  an 
opinion of a Warren majority. The case that provoked White's 
dissent was Robinson u. Calif~rnia, '~~ which held that the 
states could not make narcotics addiction a crime. In response, 
the new Justice, wanting not to  impede local police efforts t o  
stamp out narcotics abuse, accused the majority of "writ[ing] 
into the Constitution its own abstract notions of how best to  
handle the narcotics pr~blern."'~' 
Justice White's string of dissents from some of the major 
criminal procedure opinions of the Warren Court continued 
thereafter. He dissented in Escobedo u. I l l in~ is , '~  which 
invalidated a confession obtained at a police station from a 
defendant who had asked to see his lawyer, who was present in 
another room in the station house; in Malloy u. Hogan,ls9 
which held the Fifth Amendment binding on the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment; in Miranda u. Arizona,'" which 
prohibited all custodial interrogation in the absence of an 
133. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 333 (quoting Kenneth Clark, who was 
present at the meeting). 
134. Id. at 332. 
135. Id. at 334. 
136. 370 US.  660, 685 (1962) (White, J., dissenting). 
137. Id. at 689 (White, J., dissenting). 
138. 378 US.  478, 495 (1964) (White, J., dissenting). 
139. 378 U.S. 1, 33 (1964) (White, J., dissenting). 
140. 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
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attorney; in Berger u. New York,14' which invalidated New 
York legislation authorizing wiretapping upon issuance of a 
judicial warrant; and in United States v. Wade,14' which 
prohibited the holding of post-indictment lineups in the absence 
of counsel. 
In his dissents, White expressed a concern similar to that 
held by Robert Kennedy and the Kennedy Justice Department 
about the effectiveness of law enforcement. In Miranda, for 
instance, he wrote that the majority's rule would "slow down 
the investigation and the apprehension of confederates" and 
"return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets . . . to  
repeat his crime."'43 He worried about the rule's "impact on 
those who rely on the public authority for protection and who 
without it can engage only in violent self-help."'" Similarly 
in Berger u. New Y ~ r k , ' ~ ~  where the majority struck down a 
statute similar to  one that White supported as Deputy Attorney 
General,146 the Justice argued that official eavesdropping and 
wiretapping are "irreplaceable investigative tools which are 
needed for the enforcement of criminal laws," especially in view 
of the "interrelation between organized crime and corruption of 
government officials" and "the enormous difficulty of 
eradicating both forms of social cancer."14' 
His concern for effective law enforcement endured until his 
last days on the Court. With the conservative ascendance of the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the federal judiciary took an 
increasingly hostile view of the rights of the accused, and 
Justice White found himself authoring opinions of the Court 
instead of dissents. A classic example of White's pragmatism 
and concern for effective law enforcement is Minnesota v. 
Di~kerson, '~~ in which the Court upheld the right of the police 
to seize contraband, such as cocaine, detected while frisking a 
suspect. Justice White believed that the "practical 
considerations" that justified the warrantless seizure of 
contraband in the "plain view" of the police also justified the 
388 U.S. 41, 107 (1967) (White, J., dissenting). 
388 U.S. 218, 250 (1967) (White, J., dissenting). 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 542, 544 (White, J., dissenting). 
Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). 
388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
Berger, 388 U.S. at 113, 116-17 (White, J., dissenting). 
113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993). 
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seizure of materials discovered during a routine pat-down of a 
suspect. 14' 
Nevertheless, Justice White proved not to be a complete 
conservative. Thus he joined the Court's opinion in Gideon v. 
Wainwrightls0 requiring appointment of counsel for all 
indigents accused of felonies, and wrote a concurring opinion in 
Spinelli v. United States,lsl a 5-3 decision requiring strict 
guidelines for the issuance of search warrants based on 
informants' tips. In 1967, he authored two leading decisions 
applying the Fourth Amendment to administrative 
searches,152 and in the years following Earl Warren's 
retirement as Chief Justice, White joined in two important pro- 
civil-liberties decisions: Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,lss which authorized judicial 
implication of civil remedies for violation of the Constitution, 
and Furman v. Georgia,ls4 which temporarily suspended use 
of the death penalty. In the past decade, he even dissented on 
occasion from majority opinions upholding warrantless searches 
in criminal cases,155 and in James v. ~llinois'" he provided 
the critical fifth vote in a 5-4 case that refused to enlarge the 
impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule. In one of the 
last Court opinions which White authored before he retired, 
Helling u. McKinney,ls7 he held that the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment prevented 
state prison authorities from exposing prisoners to 
unreasonable risks to their hture health by placing them in a 
cell with a smoker. 
Moreover, Justice White's refusal to acknowledge a broad 
panoply of federally protected individual rights did not stem 
from the old Frankfurter-Harlan concern for state autonomy. 
The Justice never opposed the application of the Bill of Rights 
to the states; indeed, he authored Duncan v. Louisiana,'" a 
149. Id. at 2137. 
150. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
151. 393 U.S. 410, 423 (1969) (White, J., concurring), abrogated by Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
152. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
153. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
154. 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (White, J., concurring). 
155. See Varat, supra note 103, at 406. 
156. 493 U.S. 307 (1990). 
157. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993). 
158. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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leading incorporation opinion. When White dissented from 
criminal procedure cases, he did so on the merits-with reasons 
applicable in federal as well as state prosecutions-because he 
thought the majority was too severely restricting the power of 
all levels of government by creating individual rights. Thus, 
Justice White's views on issues of constitutional criminal 
procedure do not follow a discernible pattern embraced by other 
members of the Court. 
A comparably mixed but ultimately anti-individualist 
pattern emerges from White's votes and opinions in a series of 
freedom of expression cases that came before the Court during 
the social tumult of the 1960s. In the first two of these cases, 
the Justice voted to protect protestors' rights of expression. 
Thus, in Edwards v. South Ca r~ l ina , ' ~~  he joined an opinion 
of the Court reversing breach of the peace convictions of 187 
black students who had marched along the grounds of the state 
capitol to protest against racial discrimination; the 
Constitution, according to the Court, did "not permit a State to 
make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views," 
especially when the convictions were not the product of "the 
evenhanded application of a precise and narrowly drawn 
regulatory statute."'60 Similarly in Brown v. Lo~isiana,'~' 
involving the conviction of five young blacks for refusing to  
leave a segregated reading room of a public library, White 
found it "difficult to avoid the conclusion that petitioners were 
asked to leave the library because they were Negroes,"'" and 
therefore he concurred in reversing the convictions. He was 
also willing to concur in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,'" which permitted high school 
students to wear black armbands in protest against the 
Vietnam War. 
When protest threatened either to  destabilize the power 
structure or to  become offensive, however, White pulled back 
from a broad reading of the First Amendment. In Cox v. 
L~uis iana , '~  he would have affirmed the conviction of a 
159. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
160. Id. at 236-37. 
161. 383 U.S. 131, 150 (1966) (White, J., concurring in the result). 
162. Id. at I51 (White, J., concurring in the result). 
163. 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (White, J., concurring). For later majority and 
dissenting opinions by White upholding the rights of high school students, see 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977) (White, J., dissenting), and Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
164. 379 US.  536 (1965); 379 U.S. 559, 591 (1965) (White, J., concurring in 
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minister who led a march on the third-floor jail in a local 
courthouse to protest the arrest of students who had picketed 
stores maintaining segregated lunch counters. In Justice 
White's view, the marchers had obstructed public passageways 
and, by marching on a courthouse, had threatened the 
independence and integrity of the judiciary. The next year he 
became part of a 5-4 majority affirming the convictions of black 
students who had demonstrated on the premises of a jail,'" 
and two years after that case, he joined another majority that 
affirmed a conviction of an anti-war protester who had burned 
his draft card? Arguably, demonstrations in a jail yard and 
public burnings of draft cards somehow threatened the ability 
of government agencies-the prison system and the Selective 
Service System-to carry out their functions; and perhaps these 
slim threats to  the functioning of government account for 
Justice White's narrow reading of the First Amendment in the 
Adderley and O'Brien cases. A year after O'Brien, however, the 
Justice made it clear that he would permit the prosecution of 
protesters even when their protests lacked any tendency to 
destabilize the power structure: in his dissent in Street v. New 
yorklB7 and his later refusal to  join the majority in Cohen u. 
California,'" he signalled his view that offensive protest, 
such as burning the flag or including four-letter expletives in 
political speeches, was not entitled to  constitutional protection. 
Justice White's lukewarm support for dissenters' rights of 
free expression continued into the 1980s. For instance, in Perry 
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'nlB9 the Justice, 
writing for the majority of the Court, held that the First 
Amendment's Free Speech Clause did not forbid a school 
district from giving the exclusive bargaining representative of 
part and dissenting in part). 
165. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
166. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
167. 394 U.S. 576, 610 (1969) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White joined the 
dissents in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting), and United States v. Eichman, 496 US. 310, 319 (1990) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting), in which a divided Court reaffirmed that burning the American flag is 
protected expression under the First Amendment. The dissent in Taus u. Johnson 
equated flag burning with "an inarticulate grunt or roar that . . . is most likely to 
be indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others." 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
168. 403 U.S. 15, 28 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part with the dissenting 
opinion of Blackmun, J.). 
169. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
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the district's teachers preferential access to  the district's 
internal mail system, even though a rival union sought access. 
Since the mail system was not a traditional or designated 
public forum open for use by the public generally, the district 
needed only show that its denial of equal access was 
"reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely 
because public officials oppose the speaker's view."'" As long 
as there was no conscious purpose on the part of officials "to 
discourage one viewpoint and advance another," White saw 
nothing wrong with granting preferential treatment due t o  the 
one union's status as the exclusive bargaining representative of 
the district teachers,'?' even if the effect of the preference 
would be to preserve the power of the established union at the 
expense of the potentially destabilizing outsider. 
Justice White appears to have been ready to  give effect to 
libertarian values incorporated in the First Amendment only 
when they posed no danger of destabilizing or offending 
traditional sensibilities. Thus, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center 
Moriches Union Free School Di~tr ic t , '~~ he authored a 
unanimous opinion striking down as a violation of the First 
Amendment a school district regulation that prohibited the 
after-hours use of school property for meetings with religious 
purposes, on the ground that the regulation discriminated 
against the presentation of religious views concerning 
otherwise acceptable subjects such as the family and child- 
rearing.173 Justice White dismissed the school district's 
concern that to allow religious groups to  use school facilities 
would violate the Establishment Clause, since there was "no 
realistic danger that the community would think that the 
District was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any 
benefit to  religion or to the Church would have been no more 
than in~idental."'~~ 
Justice White's views about the propagation of traditional 
values, the propriety of rational political discourse, and the 
inappropriateness of destabilizing and offensive protest were 
probably shared by most liberal Americans in the early 1960s. 
His views were certainly shared by his colleagues in the 
170. Id. at 46. 
171. Id. at 49. 
172. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). 
173. Id. at 2143, 2147. 
174. Id. at 2148. 
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Kennedy Justice Department: recall, for instance, the 1963 
meeting between Department officials and black activists a t  
which Robert Kennedy was shocked by the statement of a 
young black activist that he would not fight for the nation in a 
war.175 By the late 1960s, however, many liberals had 
changed their views: Robert Kennedy himself, after attending a 
June, 1968 meeting with black militants in Oakland, 
California, where he was abused with statements such as, we 
"don't want to hear none of your shit. What the goddamned hell 
are you going to do, boy," told an aide that he was "glad" he 
had gone to the meeting, since the militants "need to know 
someone who'll listen."176 He knew that many blacks have 
"got a lot of hostility and lots of reasons for it" and that, 
"[wlhen they get somebody like me, they're going to take it out 
on me."177 He also knew that, "after all the abuse the blacks 
have taken through the centuries, whites are just going to have 
to let them get some of these feelings out."178 As the Kennedy 
biographer Arthur Schlesinger commented, Robert Kennedy 
had taken a "long journey" from his first meeting with black 
militants nearly five years earlier?' Justice White, having 
gone to the Court, never took that journey and so had 
remained in a world where rational discourse rather than 
emotion was the essence of political expression in a free society. 
V. THE NEW LIBERALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT 
As we have seen, Justice White diverged from other 
liberals on the Supreme Court in  a variety of cases. Although 
he joined the liberals in most of the civil rights cases, 
particularly those dealing with the desegregation of public 
facilities, White refused to sign on to the liberal agenda of 
recognizing and expanding individual rights. In the seminal 
right to privacy cases such as Roe and Bowers, in the criminal 
procedure cases such as Miranda and Escobedo, in the freedom 
of expression cases such as Texas v. Johnson and United States 
v. Cohen, White and other liberal Justices found themselves on 
opposing sides of an ongoing jurisprudential debate. While the 
Warren Court's embrace of individual rights unleashed a tidal 
175. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
176. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4 ,  at 909. 
177. Id. at 908. 
178. Id. at 909. 
179. Id. 
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wave of liberal academic commentary that envisioned the 
judiciary as an engine for social change, Justice White 
remained steadfast in his belief that the Court's ability and 
authority to engineer a better world were limited. 
This refusal to embrace the individual-rights-oriented 
jurisprudence of the Warren Court did not reflect as much a 
conservative shift for the Justice as a distinct ideological 
transformation in concepts of liberalism. The late 1960s 
wrought a fundamental change in the goals of many American 
liberals. In the early 1960s the goal of liberals-and the 
primary goal of the Warren Court-was the use of national 
power, including the judiciary's power, to facilitate pragmatic 
social change, especially in the areas of racial equality and 
legislative apportionment. For this purpose, government and 
the democratic political process were to be trusted and their 
power enhanced, not impaired. When he was appointed to the 
Court in 1962, Justice White agreed with this liberal agenda of 
nationalism, democracy, equality, and pragmatic social reform. 
But the Warren Court also embraced a second goal: the 
enhancement of individual rights and the consequent 
restriction of governmental authority. Justice White never 
signed on to  this anti-statist program. When he came to the 
Court in the early 1960s, it was a subsidiary part of the 
Warren agenda. But as first the racial protests, then the 
Vietnam War and the anti-war protests, and finally the 
misfeasance of the Nixon years convinced many Americans that 
government often cannot be trusted, the goal of creating 
individual rights to restrict governmental power assumed 
increasing centrality for the liberal wing of the Warren and 
Burger Courts. The Justice had not changed; liberalism had. 
The divergence between Justice White and other liberals 
on the Court also reflected division on a more fundamental 
question of political philosophy: the value of individual rights 
in a representative democracy. Jurists and academics alike 
have struggled for over two centuries with the question of how 
to  integrate the distinctly anti-majoritarian notion of individual 
rights into a system of government premised upon the 
democratic majoritarian ideal.''' During the early debates 
over ratification of the Constitution, Federalists and Anti- 
Federalists divided over the need for an express enumeration of 
180. HENRY S. COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS (1943); JOHN 
H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
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individual rights in the constitutional text. The potential 
tyrannical impulse of the majority troubled both Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists alike, but the two groups diverged over 
how to address the problem. The Federalists had an abiding 
faith that the democratic process, if properly constructed, could 
mitigate the intemperate zeal of the majority. In The Federalist 
No. 10, James Madison argued that both the size of the 
republic and the method of electing representatives insured 
that factions could not constitute a repressive majority.lgl 
While the Federalists thought the answer lay in the structure 
of the government, the Anti-Federalists desired an express 
enumeration of individual rights to limit the power of the 
national government.lg2 Alexander Hamilton in The Fed- 
eralist No. 84 responded that a bill of rights was not only 
unnecessary but "dangerous" since the enumeration of rights 
"would afford a colorable pretext to claim more [powers] than 
were granted."lm Nevertheless, the Anti-Federalists deman- 
ded, as the price for their support in ratifying the Constitution, 
a promise by the Federalists to introduce a bill of rights in the 
first Congress. la 
The history of American jurisprudence in the intemening 
two hundred years confirms that no final resolution of this 
debate has been achieved. At different points in American 
history, one view has prevailed for a period of time only to 
witness the reemergence of the other. In the early twentieth 
century, for example, the Court embarked, under the aegis of 
substantive due process, upon a dramatic and controversial 
program of invalidating national and state legislation in the 
name of individual property rights. In cases such as Lochner, 
the Court set aside progressive socio-economic legislation in the 
name of liberty of contract. Although the New Deal nailed 
closed the coffin on economic substantive due process,lg5 the 
underlying tension between maj orit arianism and individual 
rights remained.lg6 The Warren Court's expansion of civil 
181. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 127-28 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987). 
182. See Essays of Brutus, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 117-22 (Herbert 
J. Storing ed., 1985). 
183. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick 
ed., 1987). 
184. See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & KYM S. RICE, ARE WE TO BE A NATION? 
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 207-13 (1987). 
185. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
186. But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN C O N ~ I O N A L  LAW (2d ed. 
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rights for individuals rekindled the long-standing debate; much 
of the criticism levelled by liberals at the Lochner-era Court 
found new adherents in the conservative critics of the Warren 
Court and its jurisprudential progeny such as Roe.18' 
Here lies the most important lesson to  draw from 
American constitutional history: the recognition and expansion 
of individual rights is not the sole province, much less the 
defining characteristic, of liberalism. The most ardent critics of 
Lochner-era jurisprudence were the New Dealers intent upon 
using the power of government to  implement progressive social 
policies, and it was jurisprudential liberals, precursors of 
Justice Byron R. White, who repudiated the doctrine of 
substantive due process that jeopardized and delayed the 
implementation of the New Deal. Moreover, an individual- 
rights-oriented jurisprudence is not the sole domain of 
liberalism even today. Several noted academic theorists such as 
Richard Epstein and Bernard Siegan are proponents of an 
individual-rights-based jurisprudence that, if ever embraced by 
the Court, would trigger an avalanche of liberal ~riticism.'~ 
Many of the hallmarks of liberalism, such as rent control, 
employment discrimination, and consumer protection statutes, 
would be among its first victims. Thus, to equate liberalism 
with individual rights is to take a very narrow view both of 
American constitutional history and of the ends of liberalism. 
This tension between individual rights and majoritarian 
power also implicates a more fundamental and long-standing 
debate among political theorists. At the time of the American 
founding, two competing conceptions of just government were 
fighting for preeminence in Western political philosophy. On 
the one hand, the Scottish philosopher David Hume and the 
French political theorist Montesquieu had focused upon 
republican mechanisms for creating a regime immune to the 
destabilizing and reactionary impulses of majoritarian 
govern~nent.'~~ Hume acknowledged that human nature was 
1988). 
187. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANS~RMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). 
188. See RICHARD A. EPSI'EIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, 
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980). 
189. See Lance Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the 
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inherently self-interested and that "[a111 plans of government 
which suppose great reformation in the manners of mankind 
are plainly imaginary."lgO Instead, the superior regime was 
one that acknowledged yet counterbalanced the frailties of 
human nature. "Good laws may beget order and moderation in 
the government where the manners and customs have instilled 
little humanity or justice into the tempers of men."191 
Montesquieu added that a separation of powers among the 
different organs of government, together with a system of 
checks and balances among those organs, was the best method 
t o  ensure both the stability of the regime and its political 
liberty.lg2 The influence of this strand of liberalism upon the 
Federalists should not be doubted. In fact, Madison's The 
Federalist No. 10 was both inspired by and borrowed heavily 
from Hume.ls3 Presaging Madison's own discourse upon the 
propensity of democratic regimes to fall prey to factionalism, 
Hume remarked that "[tlhough it is more difficult to form a 
republican government in an extensive country than in a city, 
there is more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it 
steady and uniform without tumult and faction."'" 
On the other side, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel 
Kant were less sanguine about the internal mechanics of 
political authority. Rather, they, and more particularly Kant, 
focused upon the limits and ends of governmental power. 
Largely ignoring the practical question upon which Hume and 
Montesquieu had dwelled of how to construct the best republic, 
Rousseau searched for universal principles of civil government 
and claimed that "[ilf one enquires [sic] into precisely wherein 
the greatest good of all consists, which should be the purpose of 
every system of legislation, one will find that it boils down to 
Constitution, 1789 to 1793, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 167, 173-74 (1974, reprinted in 
THE FORMATION AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: MAJOR HISTORICAL 
INTERPRETATIONS 39, 45-46 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987). 
190. DAVID HUME, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, in HUME'S MORAL AND 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 373, 374 (Henry D. Aiken ed., 1948). 
191. DAVID HUME, That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science, in HUME'S 
MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 190, at 295, 302. 
192. See 1 CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. XI, ch. VI, 
162-74 (Thomas Nugent trans. & J.V. Prichard ed., 1902) (1748). 
193. See Douglass Adair, "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science": David 
Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 343 
(1957), reprinted in THJl FORMATION AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: 
MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS, supra not.  189, at 21. 
194. HUME, supra note 190, at 384. 
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the two 
believed 
general 
principal objects, liberty and eq~al i ty . " '~~  Rousseau 
that the only sovereign worthy of the name was the 
will of the people and that humanrights were both its 
ultimate expression and the greatest safeguard of liberty and 
equality.lg6 Kant, who was heavily influenced by Rousseau, 
expanded Rousseau's idea that the general will embodied itself 
in rights. Kant postulated the kingdom of ends, a metaphysical 
empire where autonomous individuals were both rulers and 
ruled. This reciprocity, epitomized by the categorical 
imperative, reflected Kant's unflagging belief in the inalienable 
dignity and equality of humanity. As such, Rousseau and Kant 
were the philosophical fathers of modern individualism with its 
emphasis on rights as the basis of political legitimacy and 
progressivity and its reliance on law as the guarantor of 
political liberty and equality. Whether by design or by 
happenchance, these two strands of liberalism-the 
republicanism of Hume and Montesquieu and the individualism 
of Rousseau and Kant-are embedded within the American 
political system. 
This is where disappointment voiced by many liberals 
about Justice White goes astray. Justice White remained a 
committed adherent of liberalism, albeit a particular strand of 
liberalism that fell out of favor with Justice Brennan and other 
judicial liberals. Much like the Federalists of 1787-1788, 
Justice White believed in  the republican system with its 
reliance on the democratic process. His record in the 
reapportionment and voting rights cases reflected his belief 
that the most social good comes from a correctly designed and 
well-functioning democratic system. In his opinion, political 
participation, not judicial creation of rights, holds the greatest 
promise for true social and economic reform. As Justice White 
suggested in Bowers, the judiciary's recognition of anti-statist, 
individual rights would not create a better world for the weak 
and powerless any more than anti-statist, property-rights 
jurisprudence did in the 1930s.lg7 Only the power of 
government can, in White's view, improve the world. 
195. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: DISCOURSE ON THE 
ORIGIN OF INEQUITY, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 46 (Donald A. Cress ed. & 
trans., 1983). 
196. Id. at 37 
197. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986). 
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In  the end, we need to understand that Justice White 
divided from other liberals on the Supreme Court like Justice 
Brennan, not over whether to be a liberal but over how to be 
liberal. White appeared and sometimes acted as a conservative 
primarily because of his commitment to a Madisonian political 
style focusing on the proper ordering of government 
institutions-an approach tha t  has been co-opted by 
conservative theorists in recent decades, and his rejection of 
Kantian philosophy-to which today's liberals are tending to 
link their cause. But there is no necessary connection between 
liberalism and Kantian theory, and thus, i t  is a mistake to 
conclude that Justice White and others who reject Kantian 
individualism thereby cease to be progressive. 
Indeed, Madisonian thought may in the end prove superior 
to Kantian thought as a means to social justice. If the object of 
a just society is to protect individuals from majoritarian 
encroachment on their rights, Madison's political thought 
continues to provide a useful approach. Perhaps it is even 
superior to a Kantian approach: the relative value of the two 
must depend on the ease with which repressive majorities can 
coalesce in a Madisonian world in comparison with the nature 
of the rights that any particular interpretation of Kantian 
theory would protect, and the solidity with which it would 
protect them. If, in contrast, the progressive goal is to 
redistribute wealth, Madisonian theory almost surely trumps 
Kantian philosophy since it is centrally a theory about 
channelling government power for achievement of the public 
good, while Kant focuses almost entirely on protecting 
individuals. 
This Article, which is written to congratulate Justice White 
on his retirement after thirty-one years on the bench, is not the 
place for ultimate judgments on the relative merits of 
Madisonian and Kantian theory. What needs to be noted is 
only that  Justice White by the end of his tenure had become 
the Court's only progressive in the Madisonian and New Deal 
tradition-a tradition that has contributed significantly to the 
American polity as we know it today. Whether or not we agree 
with the Justice, we owe him our appreciation for keeping this 
important tradition alive. 
